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For want of a dime, the Sherman Antitrust Act' has been turned on its
head.2 In 1961, a newspaper carrier in Kirkwood, Missouri, charged his customers an extra dime per month for the St. Louis Globe-Democrat." The newspaper
tried to prevent the price increase, but its efforts were blocked by the U.S.
Supreme Court. 4 The Court applied the Sherman Act's prohibition against any
'Editor's Note: This note received the Gertrude Brick Law Review Apprentice Prize for the best
note submitted in the Fall 1986 semester.
1. 15 U.S.C. §9 1-7 (1982). The Sherman Act oudaws "every contract, combination ...
or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce .... ." Id. The scope and meaning of this

broad language was left to the courts. L.

SULLIVAN,

HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST

165

(1977). The Supreme Court long ago acknowledged that the language of the Sherman Act cannot
be applied literally. In Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918), Justice
Brandeis wrote: "Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains ....
The
true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby
promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition." Id.
2. See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 170 (1968) (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("The
Court today stands the Sherman Act on its head."); see also Blair & Kaserman, The Rule and
Consuner Welfare: An Economic Analysis, 33 U. FLA. L. REV. 461, 482 (1981) (Albrecht turns the
Sherman Act on its head and should be reconsidered); Handler, Reforming the Antitrust Laws, 82
COLUM. L. REV. 1287, 1297 (1982) ("The mischief of Albrecht continues; the time for correction
is long overdue."); Harrison, Price Fixing, the Professions and Ancillary Restraints: Coping with Maricopa
County, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 925, 927 ("dubious wizardry of Albrecht").
3. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 147 & n.2 (1968).
4. Id. at 148-49.
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agreement between seller and buyer that fixes the price at which the buyer
may resell the product. 5 However, the Court's application of this prohibition
to newspaper publishing, an industry with a unique economic structure, 6 spawned
a body of law that defeats the goals and purposes of the Sherman Act.
Although antitrust laws theoretically protect consumers,' courts have protected independent newspaper distributors who overcharge their customers. 8 Despite Congress' intention that antitrust laws should preserve competition, 9 applying
the Sherman Act to newspaper distribution systems has impeded the operations
of an industry where competition is nearly extinct at the producer level and
never has existed at the distributor level.' 0 Ironically, although federal antitrust
laws were designed to preserve small, independent businesses," courts have
2
fostered the elimination of hundreds of independent newspaper distributors.
Because courts have prohibited newspapers from fixing prices among distributors, newspapers are prompted to hold prices down by switching to a system
of complete ownership of distribution.
In a series of decisions 3 that began with the Globe-Democrat case, federal
courts allowed newspapers to gain a monopoly over distribution. On the other
hand, by declaring price ceilings placed on distributors illegal, these courts

5. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373 (1911); see also L. SULLIVAN, supra
note 1, at 377-78.
6. See generally S. OPPENHEIM & C. SHIELDS, NEWSPAPERS AND THE ANTITRUST LAws ch. 1
(1981) [hereinafter cited as NEWSPAPERS AND ANrrrRUST] (discussing the unique structural and behavioral characteristics of the newspaper business); see also infra notes 30-50 and accompanying text.
7. R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 50-89 (1978) (arguing that consumer welfare is the
sole legitimate goal of the antitrust laws); E. SULLIVAN & H. HoVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW POLICY
AND PROCEDURE 1, 3 (1984) (current antitrust analysis suggests courts interpret the law to maximize
consumer welfare).
8. See, e.g., Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
9. Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) ("Sherman Act was designed
to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition.").

10.

NEWSPAPERS AND ANTITRUST,

supra note 6, at 2-3; Hovenkamp, Vertical Integration by the

Newspaper Monopolist, 69 IowA L. REV. 451, 452-54 (1984).
11. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962) ("[W]e cannot fail to
recognize Congress' desire to promote competition through the protection of viable, small, locally
owned businesses.").
12. See, e.g., White v. Hearst Corp., 669 F.2d 14 (1st Cir. 1982); Paschall v. Kansas City
Star, 695 F.2d 322 (8th Cir. 1982), reo'd, 727 F.2d 692 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 222
(1984); Auburn News Co. v. Providence Journal Co., 659 F.2d 273 (1st Cir. 1981), cert.
denied,
455 U.S. 921 (1982); Naify v. McClatchy Newspapers, 599 F.2d 335 (9th Cir. 1979); Knutson
v. Daily Review, Inc., 548 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 910 (1977), on remand,
468 F. Supp. 226 (N.D. Cal. 1979); Blankenship v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1975);
Grill v. Reno Newspapers, 6 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1818 (D. Nev. 1980); Neugcbauer v. A.S.
Abell Co., 474 F. Supp. 1053 (D. Md. 1979); Newberry v. Washington Post Co., 438 F. Supp.
470 (D.D.C. 1977); Hardin v. Houston Chronicle Publishing Co., 434 F. Supp. 54 (S.D. Tex.
1977), aff'd per curian, 572 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1978); McGuire v. Times Mirror Co., 405 F.
Supp. 57 (C.D. Cal. 1975); Lamarca v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 395 F. Supp. 324 (S.D.
Fla.), aff'd mer., 524 F.2d 1230 (5th Cir. 1975).
13. See cases cited supra note 12.
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eliminated a less restrictive alternative that would keep newspaper prices low.'
This occurred because the courts decided newspaper distribution cases under
the per se doctrine.
The per se doctrine renders any business practice to which it applies unlawful
regardless of the reasons for the practice and without inquiry into its effects.' 5
Under antitrust law, the per se rule is applied to resale price restrictions because
they inhibit price competition among dealers. '" Ordinarily, a manufacturer has
no compelling interest in a price restriction that would interfere with the buyers'
ability to resell at prices set by competitive market conditions.' 7 In most industries, a manufacturer is subject to market competition which prevents other
dealers from increasing retail prices to earn additional profits." The newspaper
industry is unique, however, because there is no competition between dealers,' 9
and the publisher has a strong interest in ensuring the price of each copy
remains low. 2" Thus, in this particular industry, the publisher's interest in resale
price restrictions is coterminous with the consumer's interest. Both groups want
to keep the price of newspapers as low as possible.
This note argues that the unique economic structure of the newspaper
industry2 ' eliminates many of the harms inherent in resale price ceilings reflected

14. See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968) and cases cited supra note 12; see also
Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., 548 F.2d 795, 805 n.10 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 910
(1977) (tracing this "double standard" all the way back to Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons
Co., 220 U.S. 273 (1911), and recognizing the paradox that contractual integration is treated far
more harshly than ownership integration).
15. The court merely decides whether the restraint falls into a category that has previously
been determined per se illegal. If it does, the defendant is guilty. Other evidentiary matters become
irrelevant, and the defendant cannot offer an affirmative defense. E. SULLIVAN & H. HOVENKAMP,
supra note 7, at 124-25; L. SULLIVAN, supra note 1, at 153. The Supreme Court's classic rationale
for the per se rule is found in Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958):
[T]here are certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on
competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable
and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or
the business excuse for their use. This principle of per se unreasonableness not only makes
the type of restraints which are proscribed by the Sherman Act more certain to the benefit
of everyone concerned, but it also avoids the necessity for an incredibly complicated and
prolonged "economic investigation" into the entire history of the industry involved, as
well as related industries, in an effort to determine at large whether a particular restraint
has been unreasonable - an inquiry so often wholly fruitless when undertaken.
Id. at 5. However, characterizing the restraint to determine whether the per se rule applies can
be time-consuming and complex. See, e.g., NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984); Arizona
v. Maricopa County Medical Soc., 457 U.S. 332 (1982); Broadcast Music Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).

16.

L.

SULLIVAN,

supra note 1, at 379-80.

17. Id. at 377; see also P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 644 (1981).
18. P. AREEDA, supra note 17, at 644-45. If a manufacturer's product is distributed through
a small number of dealers, the retail price would be higher unless the manufacturer also sells at
retail or has the power to fix maximum resale prices. Id.
19. Newspaper carriers are themselves monopolists who serve exclusive territories. See infra
notes 51, 254-55 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 30-50 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 47-66 and accompanying text.
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in other industries.Y Because the per se rule prevents an extended inquiry into
an industry, courts have not considered the economics of newspaper publishing.
This note proposes that courts should shift newspaper distribution cases to rule
of reason analysis, which calls for a broad inquiry into the nature, purpose
and effect of any challenged business practice before a decision is made about
its legality under antitrust laws. "3 Under this analysis, a court would examine
a newspaper's reasons for preventing price increases, consider the effects of a
price ceiling imposed on independent carriers, and explore the ramifications of
the rule against price ceilings. This note suggests that courts have forced newspapers to become their own distributors.2 4 Consequently, these decisions created
barriers to entry in an industry where competition is nearly extinct. 2 This note

also suggests that once courts consider the benefits of price ceilings in light
of the newspaper industry's economic structure, courts will learn that preserving
the carrier's independence permits the carrier to raise prices with impunity. 7

22. These harms include promoting horizontal cartels, Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park &
Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 407-08 (1911), and reducing competition not only between sellers of the
affected product but also between that product and competing brands. Continental T.V. Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51 n.18 (1977). They also include substituting the perhaps
mistaken judgment of the manufacturer for competitive market forces, channeling distribution through
a few large dealers, and allowing the maximum to become the minimum price. Albrecht v. Herald
Co., 390 U.S. 145, 152-53 (1968). See generally E. SULLIVAN & H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 7, at
1-3; L. SULLIVAN, supra note 1, at 1-14; see also Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S.
1, 4 (1958) (observing that the Sherman Act rests on the premise that competition will yield "the
best allocation of our oconomic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest
material progress, while at the same time providing an environment conducive to the preservation
of our democratic political and social institutions").
23. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 1, at 153. Under the rule of reason, an arrangement that does
not obviously stifle competition but may adversely affect it must be analyzed to gauge its purpose
and effect. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918); see also Albrecht v. Herald
Co., 390 U.S. 145, 154 (1968) (Douglas, J., concurring) (joining the decision but adding that this
is a rule of reason case). Justice Douglas viewed Albrecht as similar to White Motor Co. v. United
States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963), a case which was remanded for findings on the actual impact on
competition of the challenged arrangement. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
24. See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 367 F.2d 517, 522 (8th Cir. 1966) (noting the Globe-Democrat's
only alternative would be to terminate all its independent carriers and make home deliveries with
its own employees); Continental T.V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57 n.26 (1977)
(recognizing that if a per se rule prevents manufacturers from achieving efficiencies it perceives as
important to its successful operation, the rule will create an incentive for vertical integration).
25. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 603 (1953) (decision
which prompted the passage of the Newspaper Preservation Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. SS 1801-04
(1982)).
26. See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 156-59 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (describing "redeeming virtues" of resale price ceilings which include driving prices toward the level
that would be set by competition and protecting consumers from exploitation by distributors); Brief
of the Justice Department as Amicus Curiae at 21-23, Spray-Rite Serv. Corp. v. Monsanto. Co.,
465 U.S. 752 (1984) (listing potential procompetitive benefits of resale price maintenance); Blair
& Kaserman, supra note 2, at 475 (prohibiting resale price ceilings harms consumers by producing
higher prices and smaller quantities of goods and services).
27. Newspaper carriers are insulated from market forces because they serve exclusive territories. See infra note 51.
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Allowing the newspaper to set maximum prices would provide the same check
on pricing excesses that a competitive market system normally provides.28
I.

WHY NEWSPAPERS ARE DIFFERENT FROM OTHER INDUSTRIES

The newspaper industry has unique structural and behavioral characteristics
which distinguish it from other industries. These differences become critical in

newspaper antitrust cases because each case arising under the Sherman Act
must be decided on the particular facts disclosed by the record. 29 However,

because courts decide newspaper distribution cases by applying the per se rule
against resale price maintenance, courts have not analyzed the newspaper industry's economic structure. A thorough analysis reveals that newspaper publishing is different from other industries for several reasons.
First, a newspaper does not make its profits from selling papers. The price
of a newspaper rarely covers the total cost of production." The average daily
newspaper obtains about seventy-five percent of its revenues from advertising."'
Advertising rates are tied to circulation .2 Thus, a newspaper that increases its
circulation can expect to raise its advertising rates, and a newspaper whose
circulation declines can expect advertising revenues to decline. :3

28. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 167 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Blair &
Kaserman, supra note 2, at 477.
29. Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563, 579 (1925).
30. &e C. STERLING & T. HAIGHT, THE MASS MEDIA: ASPEN INSTITUTE GUIDE TO COMMUNICATION INDUSTRY TRENDS 166 (1978). In 1976, a "typical"
(but anonymous) newspaper obtained
about $7 million from its 250,000 circulation while it spent more than $9 million for newsprint
and ink. Id.; see also McGuire v. Times Mirror Co., 405 F. Supp. 57, 62 (C.D. Cal. 1975) (noting
the Times subscription price was less than it paid for its newsprint); Brief of the American Newspaper Publishers Association as Amicus Curiae at 4, Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968)
("A typical daily newspaper in the 240,000 circulation range spent in 1966 $4,411,283.05 on
newsprint and ink, while it received only $2,948,318.24 in total circulation income.").
31. NEWSPAPERS AND ANTITRUST, supra note 6, at 4; C. STERLING & T. HAIGHT, supra note
30, at 166; Hovenkamp, supra note 10, at 455; see also McGuire v. Times Mirror Co., 405 F.
Supp. 57, 62 (C.D. Cal. 1975) (noting that the Times received 85% of its revenue from advertising
and 15% from subscriptions); Brief of American Newspaper Publishers Association as Amicus Curiae
at 4, Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968) (stating that in 1967 ANPA member newspapers
derived about 75% of their revenues from advertising and 25% from circulation); Brief of Defendants-Appellees at 5, Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., 548 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433
U.S. 910 (1977) (noting the Daily Review obtained 88% of its revenues from ads and 12% from
newspaper sales).
32. Brief of American Newspaper Publishers Association as Amicus Curiae at 5, Albrecht v.
Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968) ("Advertisers view newspaper rates from a 'per inch per thousand
circulation' basis, and all newspapers reflect circulation in their rate structures. Thus, the average
line rate for a newspaper of 50,000 is 22.1 cents; for a newspaper of 100,000, 34.8 cents; for one
of 200,000, 56.1 cents; and for 500,000, $1.69."); see also Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., 383 F. Supp.
1346, 1363 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (correlation between price and circulation determines the factor of
greatest concern to advertisers: the cost per relevant exposure to potential buyers).
33. Hovenkamp, supra note 10, at 456; B. COMPAINE, THE NEWSPAPER INDUSTRY IN THE
1980s: AN ASSESSMENT OF ECONOMICS AND TECHNOLOGY 70 (1980). A survey by the American
Newspaper Publishers Association of 335 newspapers that raised subscription prices in 1966 showed
42% lost circulation. Many of the papers that managed to hold their own conducted aggressive
promotion campaigns, started well in advance of the increase. Brief of American Newspaper Pub-
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The interdependence of circulation and advertising rates protects consumers
by assuring that the retail price of each newspaper remains low enough to
attract as many readers as possible. Therefore, the rationale that the rule against
resale price maintenance protects consumers from excessive pricing has no practical application within the newspaper industry. Unfortunately, courts do not
always comprehend the relationship between circulation and advertising reve34
nues.
Second, the newspaper industry lacks a basic similarity of interest between
manufacturer and dealer, which usually exists in the common goal of maximizing sales revenue. 35 The number of subscribers is more important to a
newspaper than its sales revenues. While a newspaper would prefer to sell five
hundred newspapers for ten cents each, a carrier would make the same profit,
with less effort, by selling fifty newspapers for one dollar each. A newspaper
is more willing than an independent dealer to ensure availability of the paper
in areas that entail high distribution costs. 6 At the same time, the newspaper
faces the brunt of customer dissatisfaction about a price increase because most
that the carrier who has raised his price is not
subscribers do not understand
37
employee.
a newspaper
Third, a newspaper should not be viewed as a manufactured commodity,
sold merely for its physical embodiments in paper, ink and type. A newspaper
is a package of services in a printed medium. 3 Therefore, a newspaper publishing company's primary "product" is advertising, not the newspaper delivlishers Association as Amicus Curiae at 6-7, Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968). Price
decreases can have equally powerful effects. In 1898, The New York Times lowered its price from
three cents to a penny and reportedly tripled its circulation. A. LEE, THE DAILY NEWSPAPER IN
AMERICA 272 (1937).

34. See, e.g., Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969) (concluding that
an increase in subscription and advertising rates had not decreased circulation or advertising reveques). But see Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 604 (1953)
("[a]dvertising is the economic mainstay of the newspaper business").
35. Brief of American Newspaper Publishers Association as Amicus Curiae at 7, 12, Albrecht
v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
36. Laidlaw & Haley, Newspaper Distribution Systems and Changes in Methods of Distribution, in
ANTITRUST, THE MEDIA AND THE NEW TECHNOLOGY 183, 187 (1981). For example, a route with
widely scattered homes may have high distribution costs. NEWSPAPERS AND ANTITRUST, Supra note
6, at 73; see also McGuire v. Times Mirror Co., 405 F. Supp. 57, 61 (C.D. Cal. 1975) (carrier
whose route is relatively flat and compact does not pay the same wholesale rate as a carrier whose
route covers hilly terrain).
37. Universally, publishers state the price of the newspaper in each issue. The single-copy
price is on the front-page, almost always in the upper right-hand corner. Home delivery subscription
rates are listed in a box, usually on the second page. NEWSPAPERS AND ANTITRUST, supra note 6,
at 84; cf. Paschall v. Kansas City Star, 695 F.2d 322, 329 (8th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 727 F.2d 692
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 872 (1984) (the Star published a "note to our readers" to
inform them that home delivery rates were increased by the independent carriers and not the
newspaper).
38. NEWSPAPERS AND ANTITRUST, supra note 6, at 4; B. OWEN, ECONOMICS AND FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION 34 (1975). Contra, McGuire v. Times Mirror Co., 405 F. Supp. 57, 60 (C.D. Cal.
1975); Bowen v. New York News, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 651 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd in part and rev'd
in part, 522 F.2d 1242 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. dnied, 425 U.S. 936 (1976) (both classifying newspapers
as "commodities").
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ered by the carrier.39 Viewed as such, the economic rationales underlying the
application of the antitrust laws to conventional industrial markets have little
relevance in the context of the newspaper industry.
Fourth, a newspaper is an extremely perishable product. An undelivered
newspaper, after several hours have passed, is good only for starting fires or
lining garbage pails.4" Because newspapers cannot be stockpiled for later sale,
speedy, orderly and efficient marketing is essential to a newspaper's economic
survival. 4 1 Deadlines and daily press runs add extra costs, unique burdens, and
greater risks to publishing a daily newspaper. These costs, burdens and risks
require modification of conventional economic theory normally applied to industrial commodity markets.

42

Fifth, every daily newspaper, whether in a small town or a metropolitan
area, serves its community by emphasizing local news, local issues and local
advertising. Thus, a daily newspaper reflects community needs and requirements.4 ' This peculiarly local market means that competition in the newspaper
industry is almost extinct. 44 Statistics reveal that only 28 of the 1,533 communities where daily newspapers are published have two or more competing,
independent dailies.4 ' Another 101 communities have two or more newspapers
owned by the same company or involved in a joint operating agreement. 4"
Competition has dwindled steadily since the 1920s.

47

Since the end of World

War II, no new daily has been successful in a metropolitan area with existing
competition. 48 Natural forces cause this trend because in all but the largest
39. Brief of American Newspaper Publishers Association as Amicus Curiae at 5, Albrecht v.
Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
40. Lon Hocker, on behalf of respondent Herald Co., in oral argument of Albrecht v. Herald
Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968), before the Supreme Court, Nov. 9, 1967, in 22 ANTITRUST LAW: MAJOR
BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 602 (1979).
41. NEWSPAPERS AND ANTITRUST, supra note 6, at 71.
42. Id. at 5.
43. Id.at 3.
44. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 603 (1953).
45. Thirty communities had competing newspapers at the end of 1985. AMERICAN NEWSPAPER
PUBLISHERS Ass'st, FACTS ABOUT NEWSPAPERS '86, at 21 [hereinafter cited as NEWSPAPER '86]. In
1986, two cities became non-competitive. A joint operating agreement (JOA)has been proposed
for Detroit's two competing dailies. N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1986, at 29, col. 4, 6 (nat'l ed.). When
the proposal was announced, the Detroit News had a daily circulation of 645,016 and the Detroit
Free Press had 634,466. The Justice Department must approve the JOA under the Newspaper
Preservation Act. Competing suburban newspapers will probably challenge the proposed merger on
the ground that the resulting "mega-daily" would be an economic monopoly that would thwart
suburban competition. Id. And on May 27, the Baltimore News-American published its last edition.
N.Y. Times, May 28, 1986, at 7, col. 2 (nat'l ed.). The afternoon paper, which had been publishing
since 1773, lost $8 million in 1985 and had tried in vain since fall
of 1985 to find a buyer. Its
circulation was about 101,000, compared to 152,000 for The Evening Sun and 205,000 for The Sun,
a morning paper. One company owns both The Sun and The Evening Sun. Id.
46. NEWSPAPERS '86, supra note 45, at 21.
47. Competition in the newspaper industry peaked about twenty years after the Sherman Act
became law. In 1910, 689 cities had competing newspapers. NEWSPAPERS '86, supra note 45, at 2;
Nixon, Trends in Daily Newspaper Ownership Since 1945, 31 JOURN. Q. 3, 7 (1954).
48. N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1986, at 29, col. 6 (nat'l ed.) (quoting Morris J. Levin, a Washington lawyer who specializes in newspaper antitrust matters).
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cities, the population simply cannot support two independent, competing news49
papers.
Sixth, due to the interrelation of quality, circulation, and advertising funds,
newspapers face a threat of a rapid loss in revenues that can be triggered by
a small price change."
Because of these factors, a newspaper retains an exceptional interest in the
ultimate price of its service to the customer. This interest in price-containment
also means the potential harms which the antitrust laws are intended to prevent
are almost nonexistent in the newspaper industry.
Another characteristic of newspaper publishing also has a direct impact on
the application of antitrust laws to this industry. In evaluating newspaper pricing
practices, courts should consider independent carriers as monopolists because
they have exclusive routes granted by the newspaper. The exclusive routes give
them the power to raise prices and reduce output without competition from
other carriers."r More importantly, carriers also have the motivation to take
such action, while the newspaper does not. 2 The application of a per se rule,
however, has precluded courts from considering the effects of the carriers' monopoly powers.'" As a result, courts now give legal protection to the pricing
activities of a monopolist while ignoring the consequences for consumers.
49. NEWSPAPERS AND ANTITRUST, supra note 6, at 2; B. COMPAINE, WHO OWNS THE MEDIA?
71 (1982) (economies of scale are the primary reason for one-newspaper towns); Why FTC is Stepping
Away from Media Probes, ADVERTISING AGE, Jan. 28, 1980, at 14 (describing a FTC staff report
which concludes the Commission can do "relatively little" about the increasing numbers of onenewspaper towns because economies of scale are the primary reason they exist). But see Roberts,
Antitrust Problems in the Newspaper Industyy, 82 HARV. L. REV. 319 (1968) (contending newspapers'

anticompetitive practices are the primary deterrents to new entrants into the industry).
50. A federal district court described this behavioral feature in United States v. Citizen
Publishing Co., 280 F. Supp. 978, 985 (D. Ariz. 1968):
Generally, as the quality of a newspaper improves it receives wider public acceptance
and its circulation increases. As the circulation increases, the newspaper becomes more
attractive to merchants as an advertising medium and advertising revenues consequently

increase. The increased revenues, in turn, enable the publisher to increase his expenditures
on the news and editorial staff, wire services, and syndicated features and otherwise improve
the quality of the newspaper. As a corollary to this process, it is to be expected that if
the quality of the newspaper falls, there will be a loss of circulation to other publications,
which will adversely affect newspaper advertising revenues, and a decline in advertising
revenues will further adversely affect the quality of the newspaper, resulting in a further
decline in circulation.

See also Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., 548 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 910 (1977),
on remand, 468 F. Supp. 226 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
51. Hovenkamp, supra note 10, at 453 n.17. A newspaper delivery route is a natural monopoly. Like many other business routes, newspaper routes generally involve economies of scale.
The biggest costs involved are buying and operating a delivery truck and the driver's wages (or
profits). The marginal cost of throwing one more paper is very small. A carrier, on a particular
route, can distribute 100 newspapers almost as cheaply as 50. It would be far more expensive for
two drivers to deliver 50 papers each. Id. And if carriers could sell newspapers all over a city,
the cost of service would increase and reliability and promptness of delivery would decline. Pitofsky,
The Sylvania Case: Antitrust Analysis of Non-Price Vertical Restrictions, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 25 (1978).
52. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
53. See, e.g., Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., 548 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433
U.S. 910 (1977). The newspaper asserted the monopoly power of its carriers as a defense, but the
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II.

THE BACKDROP OF THE RULE AGAINST RESALE PRICE CEILINGS

Newspapers cannot prevent price increases by independent carriers because
most courts apply a per se rule against price restrictions imposed by a manufacturer on its distributors. 54 Nevertheless, the per se rule rests on an unsteady
foundation." The rule has its origins in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons

Co.'" However, the Dr. Miles court did not explicitly state a per se rule, and
the language of the opinion allows an inquiry into the procompetitive effects
of resale price maintenance." The elaborate system of contracts between Dr.
Miles Medical Company, its wholesalers and its retailers, fixed resale prices for
medicines and amounted to a cartel."" This arrangement offered no benefits to
consumers and, therefore, should have been declared unlawful under horizontal price-fixing precedent."" Dr. Miles offered two defenses which included
no consumer-welfare arguments."' Thus, a sweeping condemnation of the restraints on competition was warranted and a consideration of possible consumer
benefits would have been superfluous. Even so, the Court's denunciation of
Dr. Miles' practices was narrow enough to indicate the Court would accept
meritorious consumer-welfare arguments from future defendants. 6' The Court

Ninth Circuit rejected the argument because Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968), established
a per se rule which precludes inquiry into the economic rationale for the practice. Knutson v.
Daily Review, Inc., 548 F.2d 795, 806 n.12 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 910 (1977).
54. See, e.g., Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
55. See Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 6, 24, Spray-Rite Serv. Corp. v.
Monsanto Co., 465 U.S. 752 (1984); Comment, A Functional Rule-of-Reason Analysis for the Law of
Resale Price Maintenance and its Application to Spray-Rite v. Monsanto, 1984 Wts. L. REV. 1205,
1230-36; see also infra notes 56-66 and accompanying text.
56. 220 U.S. 373 (1911). Park & Sons, a wholesaler, obtained Dr. Miles medicine from its
distributors at prices below list and resold them below the fixed retail price. Id. at 374. Dr. Miles
sued Park & Sons for tortious interference with its contracts. Id. at 375. Park & Sons defended
on grounds that the contracts were illegal. Id. at 373. Both the trial court and the appellate court
held for Park & Sons. Id. at 383. The Supreme Court affirmed. Id. at 409; see also R. BoluK,
supra note 7, at 280; Levi, The Parke, Davis-Colgate Doctrine: The Ban on Resale Price Maintenance
in HOFFMAN'S ANTITRusT LAW AND TECHNIQUES 527, 527, 537 (1963); Pitofsky, supra note 51, at
5.
57. 220 U.S. at 406-07. The Court said:
[R]estraints of trade and interference with individual liberty may be justified by the special circumstance of a particular case. It is a sufficient justification, and indeed it is the
reasonable, that is, in reference to
only justification, if the restraint is reasonable the interests of the parties concerned and reasonable in reference to the interests of the
public ....

Id.
58. Id. at 407-08. A cartel is a concerted agreement by many competitors to fix prices or
restrict output. E. SULLIVAN & H. HovE.NKAMp, supra note 7, at 123.
59. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
60. 220 U.S. at 402, 404.
61. The Court said:
If there be an advantage to a manufacturer in the maintenance of fixed retail prices,
the question remains whether it is one which he is entitled to secure by agreements restricting the freedom of trade on the part of dealers who own what they sell. As to this,
the complainant can fare no better with its plan of identical contracts than could the dealers
themselves if they formed a combination and endeavored to establish the same restrictions,
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correctly focused on the economic consequences of the vertical restraint, but
erred in determining those consequences. The Court equated the effect of the
vertical restraints with the effect of a horizontal agreement among dealers, which
was exactly how the contracts worked in Dr. Mils.62 Nevertheless, the Court's
opinion allows restraints that do not have the effect of a cartel, although this
analysis has been overlooked by later courts.6 3 The Court concluded:
"[A]greements or combinations between dealers, having for their sole purpose
the destruction of competition and the fixing of prices, are injurious to the
public interest and void.' '64
The Court's opinion and the meaning of "sole purpose" is better understood
when considered in light of future Chief Justice Taft's"' decision in United States
v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.' His antitrust analysis recognized that any contract
entered into solely to restrain trade was illegal. An agreement that restrained
trade was lawful, however, if it was ancillary to another legitimate transaction
and necessary to make that transaction effective.6 Taft's ancillary restraints
doctrine distinguishes those restraints that are created to lessen competition from
those that are necessary to support an otherwise lawful purpose. Taft recognized
that vertical restrictions could be ancillary,68 and this view has been accepted
by modern scholars. 6 The ancillary restraints doctrine faded into the background
and thus to achieve the same result, by agreement with each other.
Id. at 407-08.
62. Id. at 407; see also Baker, Interconnectei Problems of Doctrine and Economics in the Section One
Labyrinth: Is Sylvania a Way Out?, 67 VA. L. REV. 1457, 1464 (1981).
63. See, e.g., Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968); Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc.,
548 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 910 (1977).
64. Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 408 (emphasis added).
65. William Howard Taft served as a federal circuit judge from 1892-1900. After his term
as President, he was appointed Chief Justice of the United States in 1921 and served until 1930.

J.

KANE,

FACTS

AaOUT THE PRESIDENTS 291 (1964).

66. 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aft'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). The Supreme Court explicitly
adopted the opinion of Circuit Judge Taft as its own. 175 U.S. at 226, 235. The Dr. Miles Court
also cited Addyston to support the statement quoted supra text accompanying note 64. Dr. Miles,
220 U.S. at 408. The Dr. Miles opinion also should be viewed in context with two other cases
simultaneously before the Supreme Court, which introduced the rule of reason to antitrust analysis.
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) (argued in March 1910, reargued in January
1911 and decided May 15, 1911); United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911)
(argued inJanuary 1910, reargued in January 1911 and decided May 29, 1911). Dr. Miles was
argued in January 1911 and decided April 3, 1911. Dr. Mits, 220 U.S. at 373. The Court would
thus probably not, without any explanation, apply a per se rule to a restraint it had never seen
before. The Court probably viewed the restraint in Dr. Miles as horizontal and did not intend to
apply a per se rule to all forms of resale price maintenance; see also Broadcast Music Inc. v.
Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 9, 10 n.33, 22 n.40 (1979) (emphasizing the need for
"considerable" experience with a practice before per se condemnation).
26
(1414) (Dyer's
67. Addyston, 85 F. at 282-84; see also Anonymous, Y.B. 2 Hen. 5, f.5, pl.
Case) (ancillary restraints of trade are permitted if they are reasonable); cf. Eastern Scientific Co.
v. Wild Heerbrugg Instruments Inc., 572 F.2d 883, 885-86 (1st Cir.), cert. den6id, 439 U.S. 833
(1978) (contending resale price-fixing is not unlawful, even under the rule of Albrecht, when used
as an ancillary device to implement territorial allocations).
68. See Chicago, St. L. & N.O. R.R. v. Pullman Car Co., 139 U.S. 79 (1891).
69. See, e.g., Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division
I, 75 YALE L.J. 373, 403-04 (1966). Bork defines an arrangement as vertical when "a firm
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as the rule of reason 7" became the prevailing standard of antitrust analysis. 7 '
But the emergence of the per se rule 2 under the Warren Court left open the
question of whether a rule of reason analysis would apply to a per se restraint
7
if the restraint was ancillary to a valid purpose.
As the underpinning for the per se rule against price ceilings, Dr. Miles is
a shaky foundation. 7 While the decision itself did not consider consumer benefits, it has been transformed into an inflexible rule that bars consideration of
the economic reality that a price ceiling might be beneficial to consumers. In
the context of the newspaper industry, the rule becomes even shakier because
it is being applied to a class of independent monopolists whose power to raise
prices is uncontrolled.

7

5

More than thirty years passed before the Court explicitly struck down a
resale price maintenance scheme with a per se rule,7 6 although the court considered at least four resale pricing cases in the interim. 77 All those cases looked
like horizontal dealer conspiracies, and apparently led the Court to assume that
the result of all vertical price-fixing schemes is the same as all horizontal pricefixing schemes.78 The per se rule against resale price maintenance did not
develop through a carefully weighed policy consideration of the effects of the
operating at one level of an industry places a restriction upon competition at another level of that
industry for thefirm's own benefit." Id. at 397 (emphasis added). This definition excludes restraints
which appear vertical but actually result from a horizontal cartel at any level of the industry.
70. See supra note 23.
71. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
72. See Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
73. Harrison, supra note 2, at 932; Louis, Restraints Ancillary to Joint Ventures and Licensing
Agreements: Do Scaly and Topco Logically Survive Sylvania and Broadcast Music?, 66 VA. L. REV.
879, 881-93 (1980).
74. See Baker, supra note 62, at 1465 ("Although one of the most venerable antitrust precedents, Dr. Miles is now one of the most untenable."); Pitofsky, supra note 51, at 16 n.59 (rationale
of Dr. Miles is somewhat obscure).
75. The freedom of newspaper carriers to raise home delivery prices is limited only by the
price a subscriber would have to pay if he walked to the corner and bought a paper from a rack.
In Albrecht, the home delivery price was $1.60 a month. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 367 F.2d 517,
519 n.2 (1966), reo'd and remanded, 390 U.S. 145 (1968). Based on a single copy price of 10 cents
for dailies and 25 cents for the Sunday edition, buying a single copy each day from a rack would
cost a reader about $3.60 (in a 30-day month with 4 Sundays). Albrecht had raised his price
only 10 cents per month and conceivably could have gone quite close to the $3.60 level before
his customers would forego having a newspaper delivered to their homes and choose to go out
and buy one each day.
76. United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944).
77. FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922) (defendant found guilty of unfair
competition through an elaborate resale pricing scheme); Frey & Son v. Cudahy Packing Co., 256
U.S. 208 (1921) (Sherman Act violation found); United States v. A. Schrader's Son, Inc., 252
U.S. 85 (1920) (violation found); United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919) (no
violation).
78. See cases cited supra note 63; sx also Brief of the Unites States as Amicus Curiae at 2123, Spray-Rite Serv. Corp. v Monsanto Co., 465 U.S. 752 (1984) (discussing the courts' assumption
that since Dr. Miles' resale price maintenance is so unfailingly anticompetitive, per se condemnation
is justified). Dr. Miles is often applied to cases where no dealer cartel could result. See generally,
Baker, supra note 62, at 1464 n.34. The effects of horizontal and vertical price-fixing are not likely
to be identical in all cases. See e.g., Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the
Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 282,
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practice. Instead, it evolved by default because the early cases involved restraints
with no apparent benefits to consumers.7 9 The Court's assumptions, however,
have blocked the way for later defendants to show that resale price restrictions
can benefit consumers by ensuring low prices."
III.

THE COURT BATTLE OVER NEWSPAPER PRICES

The Supreme Court's first consideration of newspaper distribution systems
under antitrust laws in 1968 demonstrated the mischief of the Court's assumption about vertical price restrictions. In Albrecht v. Herald Co. ,,"the Court
extended the per se rule to include vertical agreements aimed at fixing maximum
resale prices."2 The Court also extended section I of the Sherman Act to unilateral conduct by stretching the concept of a combination beyond the breaking
point."3 The Herald Company, which publishes the St. Louis Globe-Democrat, sold
its papers to independent carriers for distribution."4 In 1961, one of the carriers,
Lester Albrecht, raised his price ten cents per month over the suggested maximum price.' After repeated warnings, the newspaper contacted Albrecht's customers by mail, telephone, and through a solicitation agent, Milne. The
newspaper offered to deliver the paper to Albrecht's customers at the lower,
published price.; Those who accepted were transferred to another carrier, Kroner,
who was told the customers would be returned to Albrecht if Albrecht lowered
his price.8 7 When Albrecht brought his treble damage action, the newspaper
responded with a 60-day termination notice. 8 Albrecht then sold his route for
less than he would have received had he retained all his original customers.'
283-85 (1975); Note, Restricted Channels of Distribution under the Sherman Act, 75 HARV. L. REV. 795,

800 (1962).
79. See cases cited supra note 77; see also Levi, supra note 56, at 612 (law on resale price
maintenance lacks "a meaningful structure of theory").
80. See supra note 53.
81. 390 U.S. 145, reh. denied, 390 U.S. 1018 (1968); see also Herald Co. v. Harper, 293 F.
Supp. 1101 (E.D. Mo. 1968), aff'd, 410 F.2d 125 (8th Cir. 1969) (another chapter in the litigation
between Lester J. Albrecht and Herald Co.). The newspaper's claim that the treble damages
provision of the antitrust laws is unconstitutional was held "plainly insubstantial." Id.
82. Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 150. The Court cited four cases - but not Dr. Miles - as support
for the long-accepted rule "that resale price fixing is a per se violation." Id. at 145. United States
v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927) (a horizontal price-fixing case); United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (also a horizontal price-fixing case); Kiefer-Stewart
Co. v. Joseph Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951); United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc.,
351 U.S. 305 (1956). Of these cases, only Trenton Potteries cited Dr. Miles as authority. United
States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 399 (1927). However, Trenton Potteries also allows
inquiry into potential benefits of the alleged restraint. Id. at 397.
83. Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 150.
84. Id. at 147; see also Handler, supra note 2, at 1299.
85. Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 147 n.2.
86. Id. at 147.
87. Id. at 147-48.
88. Id. at 148.
89. Id. Albrecht sold his route for $12,000, which was $1,000 more than he had paid for
it. However, by the time he sold the route, he had 900 customers instead of the 1,200 he had
when the dispute with the newspaper began. Kroner testified at trial that he sold the customers
he served on the route for $3,600. Id.
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'
The trial court found for the Herald Company and the Eighth Circuit affirmed."
The Supreme Court, however, reversed," finding an illegal conspiracy to enforce
2
the resale price ceiling between the Herald Company, Milne, and Kroner."
The conspiracy was based on the premise that Milne and Kroner knew the
newspaper sought to force Albrecht to lower his price.9 ' The Court, however,
disregarded the fact that by hiring Milne, the newspaper was creating com4
petition rather than reducing it."

The Albrecht Court's economic analysis it faulty for several reasons." ' The
Court asserted that maximum price agreements substitute "the perhaps erroneous judgment of the seller for the forces of the competitive market" and thus
reduce "the ability of buyers to compete and survive in that market."'" This
rationale ignores the economics of newspaper distribution, which is performed
by carriers who are assigned to exclusive territories and are insulated from
market forces. Carriers do not compete with each other, and newspapers generally do not allow competition between carriers because that would produce
higher prices.' 7
The carriers' independent business judgment is also limited in many ways.
To maintain quality services, newspapers can demand that papers be delivered
no later than a certain time and even that they be placed in plastic bags on
rainy days. Instead of dispensing with the fiction that merely forbidding resale
price ceilings preserves the carrier's independent business judgment, the Court
accepted this fiction as fact.98 The Court's reasoning is grounded on the idea
that sellers may err in establishing a price. However, this is irrelevant to antitrust policy and antithetical to the notion of competition."9 For sellers to com-

90. Id. at 146.
91. Albrecht ultimately recovered $84,243 plus $50,000 for attorney's fees. Albrecht v. Herald
Co., 321 F. Supp. 99 (E.D. Mo. 1970), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 452 F.2d 124 (8th Cir. 1971).
92. Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 150. But see Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., 548 F.2d 795, 801-03
(9th Cir. 1976) (suggesting that parent and subsidiary corporations which published a group of
newspapers were incapable of conspiracy, without even mentioning Albrecht), cert. denied, 433 U.S.
910 (1977).
93. Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 150; see also NEWsPAPERS AND ANTITRUST, supra note 6, at 86 (describing the Court's expansion of the combination concept as "the most disturbing element" of
the Albrecht decision).
94. See NEWSPAPERS AND ANTITRUST, supra note 6, at 88.
95. The Court is not solely to blame for this faulty economic analysis. The Court declined
to accept the newspaper's claim that its resale price ceilings were necessary, because the newspaper
failed to offer evidence of the existence of exclusive territories, their reasonableness or the economic
power over price they placed in the hands of the distributors. Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 153. Instead,
the newspaper's defense consisted of challenging the Sherman Act as unconstitutional, alleging
procedural problems with plaintiff's claim for relief, and contending that plaintiff had failed to
prove the existence of a combination. See Brief for Respondent, Albrecht, 390 U.S,. 145.
96. Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 152.
97. See supra note 51; see also Albrecht v. Herald Co., 367 F.2d 517, 523 (8th Cir. 1966), rev'd,
390 U.S. 145 (1968). When one of the witnesses was asked how long the Globe-Democrat had used
a system of exclusive routes, he replied, "Forever." Albrecht, 367 F.2d at 523.
98. See Blair & Kaserman, supra note 2, at 478 n.68.
99. See Handler, supra note 2, at 1306; Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 2627, Spray-Rite Serv. Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
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pete, they must be free to make mistakes, which should result in lower profits,
not in treble damage actions. Because the market penalizes errors, firms eventually will correct their mistakes or else suffer economic consequences.""' Although this correction may take longer with some monopolies, a newspaper,
with its uniquely intense interest in selling as many papers as possible, will
focus on pricing errors which reduce circulation."" Because many newspapers
cost more to produce than the reader pays for a copy, 2 the possibility of an
excessive price is reduced to the point that it disappears.
The Albrecht Court also was concerned that the newspaper's price ceiling
would aid market concentration and might serve as a minimum price. "3 The
Court failed to understand that prohibiting price ceilings aids market concentration by forcing newspapers to terminate the independent carriers and to take
over distribution of the newspaper. "4 The Court also overlooked the fact that
newspaper prices are so low that consumers would not be harmed if the maximum price did become the minimum."" Even if it did, the problem could be
treated as horizontal price-fixing among the carriers.1 0 6 The Albrecht Court's
argument also reflects sympathy for competitors, as distinct from competition.
This is contrary to the Court's oft-quoted principle that the Sherman Act "protects competition, not competitors."'1

7

The rationale of Albrecht, the idea that price ceilings "cripple the freedom
of traders," 10 8 has since been repudiated by the Court.109 In Continental T. V.,
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,"( ' the Court rejected any analysis that makes antitrust
100.
101.

Easterbrook, Maximum Price Fixing, 48 U. CMi. L. REv. 886, 889 (1981).
See supra notes 30-33, 50 and accompanying text.

102.

See supra note 30.

103.
104.

Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 152.
See Hovenkamp, supra note 10, at 462; see also Albrecht v. Herald Co., 367 F.2d 517 (8th

Cir. 1966) (noting the Globe-Democrat's only alternative would be to terminate all its independent
carriers and make home deliveries with its own employee), rev'd, 390 U.S. 145 (1968); Continental
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 54 n.26 (1977) (recognizing that if a per se rule
prevents manufacturers from achieving efficiencies important to successful operation, the rule will
create an incentive for vertical integration).
105. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
106. Harrison, supra note 2, at 928.
107. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962).
108. Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 152 (quoting Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph Seagram & Sons, 340
U.S. 211, 213 (1951)).
109. Albrecht's "freedom of traders" language recalls the Court's assertion in United States v.
Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1977), that restricted distribution practices limit "the
retailer's freedom as to where and to whom it will resell the products," id. at 378, and so "violate
the ancient rule against restraints on alienation." Id. at 380. Shuinn was overruled by Continental
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), and the Supreme Court now judges vertical
territorial and customer restraints under the rule of reason. Id.; see also Posner, The Rule of Reason

and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. Cm. L. REv. 1, 12 (1977)
(Sylvania demolished Albrecht). Even some commentators who are generally suspicious of vertical
restraints appreciate the harmful impact of the Albrecht rule. See, e.g., Bohling, A Simplified Rule of

Reason for Vertical Restraints: Integrating Social Goals, Economic Analysis and Sylvania, 64 IowA L. REV.
461, 519-21 (1979); Pitofsky, supra note 51, at 16 n.59 ("for both theoretical and practical reasons,
there is considerable merit to the argument that the theory and result in Sylvania has [sic] undermined
Albrecht").
110. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
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cases turn on the "autonomy of independent businessmen.""' Sylvania removed
vertical non-price restraints from the per se category, ' 2 a ruling which has
virtually demolished Albrecht. ' 3 If exclusive territories are permitted, under the
Sylvania decision a manufacturer should be allowed to prevent its distributors4
from extracting unfair and excessive profits from their intrabrand monopoly."1
Without the right to establish a maximum price, a newspaper is powerless to
prevent a carrier from exploiting his exclusive territory. Interestingly, this reasoning was adopted by the Eighth Circuit in Albrecht.' The Supreme Court,
however, rejected this argument because it was unconvinced that allowing one
form of illegal restraint (price-fixing) would blunt the effect of another illegal
activity (market division)."16 Now that exclusive territories are no longer per se
illegal, the validity of the Eighth Circuit's position in Albrecht is rekindled." 7
Another newspaper distribution case, Newberry v. Washington Post Co.,"' wrestles with this problem in the wake of Sylvania. The Post distributed its newspapers
through two channels; one group of carriers provided home delivery while a
second group delivered papers to newsstands and vending machines.' "9 The
home delivery carriers were assigned to territories but were not prohibited from
selling outside those areas. " The Post and the carriers had not agreed on what
price should be charged, but the suggested price to subscribers was printed in
each edition of the newspaper and on the recommended billing forms given to
carriers. '2'
When the Post tried to change its distribution system to avoid the Albrecht
decision, fourteen carriers filed a lawsuit charging that the distribution system
illegally divided the market and fixed the price. 2 2 Relying on Sylvania and
applying the rule of reason,'2 3 the D.C. Circuit held the territorial allocation
was legal because of its economic and administrative efficiencies.' 24 The purpose
of the restraint was to promote prompt, efficient deliveries to as many readers
as possible. The Post's distribution system accomplished this goal at a reasonable

111. Id. at 53 n.21.
112. Id. at 59. However, the Sylvania Court upheld per se treatment of vertical price restraints.
It ignored Dr. Miles' reliance on the analogy to horizontal price fixing and instead reasoned that
vertical price restrictions reduce competition not only between sellers of the affected products but
also between that product and competing brands. Id. at 51 n.18.
113. See Posner, supra note 109, at 12; sewalso Stewart & Roberts, Viability of the Antitrst Per
Se Illegality Rule: Schwinn Down, How Many To Co?, 58 WASH. U.L.Q. 727, 745 (1980) (Sylvania
leaves Albrecht rule "in serious doubt").

114. See generally, Pitofsky, supra note 51; see also 3 P.

AREEDA

& D. TURNER,

ANTITRUsT LAw

734e (1978). Newspapers are trying to do precisely this. See supra text accompanying note 35.
115. 367 F.2d 517, 523 (1966), rev'd, 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
116. Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 154 ("The assertion that illegal price-fixing is justified because it
blunts the pernicious consequences of another distribution practice is unpersuasive.").
117. Stewart & Roberts, supra note 113, at 727.
118. 438 F. Supp. 470 (D.D.C. 1977).
119. Id. at 473.
120. Id. at 473-74.
121. Id. at 477.
122. Id. at 473.
123. Id. at 474 (citing Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 47-59).
124. Id. at 475.
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price.'1 5 But in its analysis of the price-fixing allegation, the court took a convoluted route '2 6 around the Sylvania holding that vertical price-fixing is illegal.
Instead of recognizing that the newspaper had valid business reasons for preventing carriers from exploiting their territories, the court relied on the absence
of any agreement establishing the carriers' prices and on a lack of coercion by
127
the Post.
The court ruled against the carriers as a group, 2 but one distributor, Albert
Newberry, prevailed. '2 9 Newberry charged his customers twenty-five cents per
month more than the suggested price. The Post retaliated by raising Newberry's
1
The court held that the Post forfeited
wholesale rates by an equivalent amount.'M
its sheltered position by retaliating against Newberry to enforce the suggested
retail price. "' By holding in favor of Newberry but against the other carriers
who claimed the Post coerced them to follow the suggested price, the decision
leaves significant questions unanswered. 3 2 For example, should a person's legal
rights depend on his or her willingness to fight a one-sided battle? More importantly, should a newspaper be allowed to minimize distribution costs and
prevent its carriers from exploiting consumers?
These questions, along with the lower courts' difficulties in reconciling Sylvania with Albrecht, demonstrate that the time is ripe for the Supreme Court to
recognize that a newspaper's price ceiling can be justified. In the words of
Justice Brandeis, the test of illegality is "whether the restraint imposed is such
as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is
such as may suppress or even destroy competition.' ' 3 Every antitrust case
necessarily raises this question, yet the Albrecht court failed to consider it.''1
Albrecht, and its progeny, have narrowed the means by which a newspaper
can protect itself and its readers from price-gouging carriers who are insulated
from price competition because of their exclusive territories."'1 The only option
left by Albrecht is for the newspaper to integrate vertically and deliver the papers
with its own employees. 136 This creates a greater problem for small newspapers
because they are less able to finance a direct distribution system than are larger,
more financially secure, newspapers.2 37 Even for newspapers that can afford it,
switching to self-delivery has spawned new antitrust issues.
125. Id.; see also Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., 468 F. Supp. 226, 232 n.7 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
126. Id. at 476-80; see also Stewart & Roberts, supra note 113, at 743.
127. Newberry, 438 F. Supp. at 477. The court noted that the Post had never taken any action
against a dealer who departed from the suggested price and added, "[t]he suggestion that these
staunch plaintiff dealers were afraid to act in their own independent best interest is not worthy of
belief." Id. at 479.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 482.
130. Id. at 481.
131. Id.
132. Stewart & Roberts, supra note 113, at 745.
133. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1948).
134. See M. HANDLER, TWENTY-FIvE YEARS OF ANTITRUST 767 (1973).
135. See supra note 51.
136. See supra text accompanying note 104.
137. About 85% of the newspapers published in the United States have daily circulations of
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IV.

OUT OF THE FRYING

PAN AND

INTO THE

FIRE

Newspapers trying to avoid the Albrecht decision by switching to self-delivery
soon found themselves facing lawsuits filed by independent carriers who charged
illegal monopolization over the delivery process."' The Kansas City Star's attempted switch to self-delivery in 19771 9 produced a courtroom fight that was
influenced by the Albrecht Court's misconception of the economics of the newspaper industry. Paschallv. Kansas City Star140 was brought by independent carriers
when the Star announced a plan to switch to self-delivery and terminate all
contracts with independent carriers. The carriers argued that the Star's action
would constitute illegal monopolization.' 4' Although the suit did not allege resale
price maintenance, the dispute between the newspaper and its carriers was
triggered by the carriers' control of subscription prices.'4 The Star's plan for
switching to self-delivery included a uniform subscription price' 43 to replace the
44

carrier-determined prices.
4
The
Upon first hearing, the Eighth Circuit found illegal monopolization.'
court characterized the Star as a potential competitor whose presence helped
keep retail prices down. The court also declared that a switch to self-delivery
2 46
The court embraced
would reduce competition in the distribution market.
Albrecht's misunderstanding of newspaper industry economics, yet ignored its
holding that the newspaper cannot compete with the carrier by offering to deliver
the paper at a price that undercuts the carrier. '47 By switching to self-delivery,
the Star had hoped to eliminate monopoly pricing by its carriers while avoiding
the consequences of Albrecht.'" The Star, however, ironically found itself faced
with a court ruling that recommended and approved what the Herald Company
14
had been condemned for doing in Albrecht.

50,000 or less. NEWsPAPERS '86, supra note 45, at 4. The typical American daily is smaller than
most people think. The average circulation is 38,000 and the median circulation is 12,000. THE
BUYING AND SELLING OF AMERICA'S NEWSPAPERS Xi (Ghiglione ed. 1984); see also McGuire v. Times
Mirror Co., 405 F. Supp. 57, 65 (C.D. Cal. 1975). The Times' switch to self-delivery in 1976
cost $1.3 million for equipment and other out-of-pocket expenses, "several million" in increased
payroll and $3 million paid to independent carriers whose contracts were terminated. Id.
138. See cases cited supra note 12. Newspapers continue to face suits alleging price-fixing. On
April 25, 1986, three carriers filed a class action lawsuit against the Pensacola News Journal in federal
district court. Associated Press report, Apr. 30, 1986.
139. Paschall v. Kansas City Star, 695 F.2d 322 (8th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 727 F.2d 692 (8th
Cir. 1984).
140. 695 F.2d 322 (8th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 727 F.2d 692 (8th Cir. 1984).
141. Id. at 325.
142. Id. at 330-32.
143. Id. at 330.
144. Id. at 330 n.10.
145. Id. at 333-34.
146. Id. at 329. But see P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 114, at 729c (labeling the potential competitor theory as an internal contradiction and offering four detailed criticisms).
147. Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 149.
148. Hovenkamp, supra note 10, at 460.
149. Id. at 463.
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Two years later, the court reheard' 5° Paschall and ruled that a switch to selfdelivery was not, by itself, illegal monopolization.15 ' The court's decision, however, appeared somewhat reluctant because it was limited to the particular facts
of the case. 52 The decision also provided a listing of possible misuses of monopoly power that would subject a newspaper to antitrust liability., The court
stood by its earlier finding that the Star was a monopolist. 154 This determination
also shows how the court misunderstood the economics of the newspaper industry. This misconception occurred because the court never considered how
a newspaper goes about monopolizing. It also failed to distinguish the market
for newspaper advertising from the market for newspaper sales. 55
The term "monopolist" means a seller who has the power to obtain a higher
price for its product by reducing output. 156 Because power over price is difficult

to measure directly, courts frequently use large market share as an indication
of power over price. 5 7 Generally, the correlation between power over price and
150. The Star petitioned for a rehearing and the Eighth Circuit agreed to reconsider the case
en banc. Paschall, 727 F.2d at 692.
151. Id. at 699. However, a newspaper that has a monopoly - virtually all newspapers in
the United States today - still faces potential antitrust liability if plaintiffs can show either (1) a
specific intention to monopolize or (2) anticompetitive effects that result from its actions. United
States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 531-32 (1948); United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S.
100, 106 (1948). These are the Court's landmark decisions on 5 2 Sherman Act violations. Paschall,
727 F.2d at 696.
152. Id. at 704.
153. Id. at 701-04.
154. Id. at 696. Possession of monopoly power is the first step in finding a violation of S 2
of the Sherman Act, which makes it unlawful to "monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine
or conspire . . . to monopolize" any part of interstate commerce. The other necessary element is
"the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development
as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen or historic accident." United States v.
Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966); see also supra note 49 and accompanying text.
155. Hovenkamp, supra note 10, at 456. For a rather dated, but still essentially valid, explanation of newspaper monopoly practices, see Corden, The Maximisation of Profit by a Newspaper, 20
REy. EcoN. STUD. 181 (1953).

156.

L.

SULLIVAN,

supra note 1, at 30-33.

157. See, e.g., FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 54 U.S.L.W. 4531 (U.S. June 2, 1986);
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966); Auburn News Co. v. Providence
Journal Co., 504 F. Supp. 292, 302-03 (D.R.I. 1980), reo'd on other grounds and remanded, 659 F.2d
273 (Ist Cir. 1981). The Auburn News court found monopoly power from the Journal's 90% share
of the market for newspapers of general circulation in the State of Rhode Island. That market
would include the journal, two Boston papers and three New York papers. AMERICAN NEwsPAPER
MARKETS, INC., CIRCULATION '85-86: CIRCULATION AND PENETRATION ANALYSIS OF PRINT MEDIA 627
(24th ed. 1986). In 1980, five other dailies were published in Rhode Island, all with less than 35,000
daily circulation. EDITOR & PuBLISHER Co., 1981 EDITOR & PUBLISHERS INTERNATIONAL YEARaOOK
at 1-24345 (1981). However, the district court eliminated these newspapers from the relevant market
because they did not circulate statewide and were more "parochial," concentrating on local news.
Had the market been defined as all daily newspapers in Rhode Island, the Journal's share would
have been about 65%. Auburn News Co. v. Providence Journal Co., 504 F. Supp. 292, 303
(D.R.I. 1980), rev'd on other grounds and remanded, 659 F.2d 273 (1st Cir. 1981). A 65% share
is lower than that usually held to establish monopoly power. United States v. Aluminum Co. of
Am., 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945) (doubtful that 60% or 64% of the relevant market is a
monopoly); see also United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966) (87%); International

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol38/iss3/5

18

Dowd: Application of the Antitrust Laws to Newspaper Distribution Syste

1986]

ANTITRUST NEWSPAPER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS

market power is very high. However, it is not a perfect correlation. Some
producers of one hundred percent of a certain product have no market power' s
while some producers of a low percentage of a particular market may have
substantial power over price.'" Therefore, a court's use of market share to
determine whether a seller is a monopolist often leads to the wrong conclusion.""
Because of the peculiarly local nature of American newspapers, most of them
are monopolists in the market for newspaper sales."" This is irrelevant to a
newspaper's decision to switch to self-delivery, however, because a newspaper
cannot increase its profits by raising the price of its papers or by reducing its
circulation.6 2 A newspaper's switch to self-delivery might be an attempt to
eliminate monopoly profits of its carriers rather than an exercise of its own
monopoly power. Or it could be prompted by a decision that it can distribute
its newspapers more efficiently than its independent carriers. In either case, the
change would be in the best interest of customers, who benefit when newspaper
circulation is maximized.'" A newspaper's switch to self-delivery produces the
same economic bottom-line as setting a resale price ceiling. Economically equivalent business practices, therefore, should receive equal antitrust treatment. The
Boxing Club, Inc. v. United States, 358 U.S. 242 (1959) (81%). Other courts have offered much
broader definitions of a newspaper's relevant market. Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., 548 F.2d
795, 804 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 910 (1977) (suburban newspapers should be considercd, as well as newspapers from other cities that circulate in any of the towns served by the
Daily Review and its sister papers); Neugebauer v. A.S. Abell Co., 474 F. Supp. 1053, 1059-61
(D. Md. 1979) (other newspapers available in Baltimore should be considered along with radio
and television stations).
158. See P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 114, at 500, 507-11; Landes & Posner, Market
Power inAntitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937, 947-49 (1981).
159. See, e.g., Dimmitt Agri Indus., Inc. v. CPO Int'l, Inc., 679 F.2d 516, 530-31 (5th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1082 (1983).
160. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 1, at 30-33.
161. Hovenkamp, supra note 10, at 457.
162. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. One possible exception to this general rule
could occur where the market is saturated and the price elasticity of demand for newspapers is
low. A newspaper in this situation may find it profitable to maximize circulation because the impact
of advertising would be small. An extreme example is presented if every person in town is already
a subscriber and they all think the newspaper is worth five dollars a month or more. A newspaper
charging three dollars a month could raise its subscription price without losing any advertising
revenue. No advertising revenue is lost because no circulation is lost. Hovenkamp, supra note 10,
at 457 n.28. However, the demand for newspapers at current delivery prices has proven to be
quite elastic. Most newspapers attempting to increase subscription prices are immediately faced with
declining circulation. B. COMPAINE, THE NEWSPAPER INDUSTRY IN THE 1980s: AN AsSEsSMENT OF
ECONOMICS AND TECHNOLOGY 32 (1980). In Paschall, circulation decreased when the Kansas City
Star tried to raise prices. 695 F.2d at 330; see also Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., 383 F. Supp.
1346, 1382 (N.D. Cal. 1974), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, and remanded, 548 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 433 U.S. 910 (1977) (circulation decreased when an independent carrier raised the
subscription price over the newspaper's objection).
163. For example, if the monopolist carrier is making 20% monopoly return, by switching to
self-delivery the newspaper can retain 20% profit (and perhaps improve the quality of the
paper) or it could lower the delivery price and increase circulation. Even if the newspaper is
a monopolist in the circulation market-that is, if it can increase profits by reducing circulation
-its vertical integration with a second monopolist yields a lower price. 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER,
supra note 114, at
725c.
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current antitrust law's different treatment of business practices that produce the
same economic result raises questions of whether forcing vertical integration
should be the intent of public policy and whether unnecessary reorganization
4
of a distribution system is proper."
Although most newspapers could switch to self-delivery today,"'" there are
valid business reasons for using independent carriers.""' These advantages, however, are available under present law only at great cost to the newspaper and
to its readers." 7 This means that switching to self-delivery is not a viable option
for smaller newspapers."' More importantly, a newspaper's switch to self-delivery eliminates hundreds of independent businesses for purposes of preserving
competition in an industry where competition is nearly extinct. For the benefit
of society, changes are needed in the law that makes the more restrictive alternative (complete ownership of distribution) per se legal, while the less restrictive alternative (a ceiling on the prices charged by the independent
distributors) is per se illegal.
V.

BLURRING THE BRIGHT LINES

Although historically the per se rule against price fixing has been the brightest of the bright line tests in antitrust,"'9 the U.S. Supreme Court has blurred

164.

Blair & Kaserman, supra note 2, at 479 n.73.

165. See cases cited supra note 12. Although the newspapers eventually won all these cases,
Paschall, 727 F.2d 692, 704 (8th Cir. 1984), the number of cases, the time they spent in the courts
and the varied grounds on which the courts relied suggest that newspapers may face frequent and
protracted legal battles.
166. In addition to the legal considerations, a newspaper must analyze the practical advantages
and disadvantages of the various distribution systems before deciding to switch to self-delivery. The
benefits of an independent dealership arrangement include the fact that independent dealers will
not unionize and the newspaper will not have to deal with all the attendant risks and costs of
dealing with a union. However, distribution through an independent dealer can mean that the
customers can face high prices and poor service - or even no service at all. An employee system
gives the newspaper complete control over the price, time and manner of delivery and it may
make a centralized and direct billing system much easier to implement and control. But employees
may unionize and an employee system will entail substantial administrative costs. Laidlaw & Haley,
supra note 36, at 187. Beyond the scope of this note are other laws which a newspaper should
consider before deciding to switch to self-delivery. These include: federal labor law, federal and
state franchise and distributorship laws, federal and state wage and hour laws, federal and state
unfair business practices laws, federal income tax laws, federal pension discrimination laws, state
antitrust laws, state contract law including the Uniform Commercial Code, and state laws governing
tortious interference with business relations. Another factor that should be considered is the risk
of liability for actions in the four years preceding a switch, so a newspaper should carefully review
its files and past practices to make sure no adequate basis exists that would support a price-fixing
claim. Id. at 192.
167. The Kansas City Star settled the dispute that triggered Paschall at a cost of almost $26
million after a legal battle that lasted nearly ten years. The 263 independent carriers who challenged
the newspaper's decision to switch to a direct delivery system received slightly less than $100,000
each in the settlement which took effect Sept. 3, 1985. INTERNATIONAL CIRCULATION MANAGERS
ASSOCIATION, ICMA UPDATE, Oct. 1986, at 4.
168. NEWSPAPERS AND ANTITRUST, supra note 6, at 93; see also supra note 137.
169. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 1, at 198.
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the line in recent years. 170 In Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia BroadcastingSystem,
the Supreme Court recognized the ancillary restraints doctrine and applied it
to support a rule of reason analysis of price-fixing. The Court noted that what
appeared to be horizontal price-fixing was necessary "to market the product
at all' ' 72 and therefore ancillary to a valid purpose. 71T The Court recognized
that while the "per se rule is a valid and useful tool of antitrust policy and
enforcement . . . easy labels do not always supply easy answers. ' 174 The question
is whether the particular practice is "plainly anticompetitive" and "without
redeeming virtue."175
The Court's most recent resale price maintentance decision, Spray-Rite Service
Corp. v. Monsanto Co., ' indicates that the rule of reason may be applied in
future cases. The Court referred to the per se rule as only the "present law"
governing resale price maintenance.' 7 7 The Court also recognized that the Department of Justice in its amicus brief, 78 several commentators and Justice
White in an earlier concurrence' 7" had argued that the economic effect of vertical
price restrictions is indistinguishable from vertical non-price restrictions. 8" Contrary authority was absent from the Court's opinion. Finally, no other justice
joined Justice Brennan's concurrence emphasizing that Dr. Miles had not been
overruled and that the Court should not overrule it in the face of Congressional
inaction.""
The Court recently blurred its bright lines further by using a rule of reason
analysis in FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists.
Even though group boycotts
had been considered per se illegal longer than resale price ceilings,'"' the Court
unanimously declined to "forc[e] the Federation's policy into the 'boycott' pi-

170. Harrison, supra note 2, at 925. While the Court has condemned price ceilings, it has
approved many other business practices which could be banned as price-fLxing. Mergers, joint
ventures and partnerships internally suppress price competition to organize production through other
means. Eastcrbrook, supra note 100, at 887.
171. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
172. Id. at 23.
173. Id. at 21-25.
174. Id. at 8.
175. Id. at 9.
176. 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
177. Id. at 763.
178. Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 21-22, Spray-Rite Serv. Corp. v Monsanto
Co., 465 U.S. 752 (1984). However, the Supreme Court did not reach the question because neither
party argued that the rule of reason should apply to a vertical price-fixing conspiracy. 465 U.S.
at 784 n.7.
179. Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 69-70 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
180. 465 U.S. at 761.
181. Id. at 769. "Congressional inaction" seems a curious way to describe the situation. A
week before the Court heard arguments in Spray-Rite, President Reagan signed Pub. L. 98-166,
an appropriations bill which included a provision banning the Justice Department from using any
of its funds to attempt to overturn or alter the per se rule against resale price maintenance.
CONGRESSIONAL

QUARTERLY INC.,

1983

ALMANAC

477-78.

182. 106 S. Ct. 2009 (1986).
183. See Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959). Resale price ceilings
were not held to be per se illegal until 1968 in Albrecht, 390 U.S. 145.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1986

21

Florida Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 3 [1986], Art. 5
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXVIII

geonhole and invok[e] the per se rule."'' "4 The FTC had not defined the relevant
market, established that the Federation had market power, or determined whether
the restraint at issue raised costs to consumers and insurers.'"" Nevertheless,
the Court found a violation of the Sherman Act despite the FTC's shortcomings. 8 6 The Court noted that it has been slow to apply per se rules to
"business relationships where the economic impact of certain practices is not
immediately obvious."' "7 The impact of newspaper pricing practices was not
immediately obvious to the Court, which misunderstood the economic structure
of the newspaper industry. The Court also failed to comprehend that its decision
in Albrecht had a far greater impact than the resale price ceilings themselves.
Today, "price-fixing" is merely a label given to arrangements found to be
unlawful per se. An arrangement's probable effects, however, must be examined
'
In recent years, the Supreme Court has
before this fatal label is attached.l w
been more willing to conduct examinations to determine which arrangements
are beneficial to consumers.' 9 If Albrecht were to reach the Court today, the
newspaper's pricing practices could not be declared "plainly anticompetitive"
and "without redeeming virtue.""' Rather, price ceilings advance consumer
welfare by preventing the carriers from reaping monopoly prices.",
VI.

THE

TRUMP CARD OF ANTITRUST LAW

Many scholars are now challenging the economic rationality of the per se
rule against resale price maintenance, particularly price ceilings."" The rule
against resale price ceilings has developed without thorough study' 3 even though
the Court has emphasized repeatedly that per se rules should be used only after
a conclusion that almost every instance of a particular practice is harmful. Thus,
there is no point in trying to separate the harmful instances from the harmless
or beneficial ones in case after case. '"'1 However, if the Court incorrectly analyzes
184. 106 S. Ct. at 2018.
185. Id. at 2018-19.
186. Id. The Court noted, with little elaboration, that the agreement impaired the ability of
the market to advance social welfare by ensuring that goods and services can be provided to
consumers at a price approximating the marginal cost of providing them. Id. at 2020-21.
187. Id at 2018.
188. Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 58-59 ("[W]e do make clear that departure from the 'rule-of-reason'
standard must be based on demonstrable effect rather than . . . formalistic line drawing.").
189. See, e.g., NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984); Broadcast Music, Inc. v.
Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 8-9, 19-20 (1979); National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs
v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688-92 (1978); Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 53 n.21 (1977); Brunswick

Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977).
190. See supra notes 35-50 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
192. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 100; Handler, supra note 2, at 1301-07; Hankin, The
Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 HARV. L. REV. 63, 257-58 (1968); Posner, 7he Next Step in the Antitrust
Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CI. L. Rav. 6 (1981).
193. See supra note 77-79 and accompanying text.

194. See, e.g., Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 649 (1980) (per se rule applies
if "a particular concerted activity entails an obvious risk of anticompetitive impact with no apparently ....redeeming value"); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S.
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the effects of a practice upon its initial encounter, or if the first defendant fails
to present the facts necessary for a proper analysis, a per se rule will automatically be applied in future cases without further consideration of the practice's effects. The Albrecht rule illustrates the harshness of such a practice because
it barricades the door to correcting the Court's misconceptions about the newspaper industry's economics. As one federal district court described it, "[t]he
per se rule is the trump card of antitrust law. When an antitrust plaintiff
successfully plays it, he need only tally his score. ' ' j Instead, courts should
consider the economic reality that price ceilings in the newspaper industry protect the ultimate consumer from being overcharged, a primary goal of antitrust
laws. 196 Allowing a newspaper to set a price ceiling prevents carriers, who are7
themselves monopolists, from exploiting their customers. Because it is lawful"'
to grant exclusive territories, it should also lie lawful to place further conditions
on the grant, such as price restraints which are likely to aid consumers."9"
The per se rule proponents argue that interests in judicial convenience,
efficient enforcement of the antitrust laws and clear guidance to the business
community justify treating as illegal those arrangements which upon full review
might be found to be procompetitive.' 99 This view is inconsistent with the original description of the per se rule as applying to business practices which lack
any redeeming value.2 " The view, however, is in harmony with the more subtle
formulation of Sylvania, which recognizes that exceptional cases will arise but
"are not sufficiently common or important to justify the time and expense
necessary to identify them.' '1201 Newspaper distribution systems may be the exceptional case, but a limited exception is justified because newspapers are an
easily identifiable class. In addition, they play an important role in the functioning of American democracy because of their role in the dissemination of
vital information. 202 Because so many newspaper distribution cases have reached
1, 9-10, 19 n.33, 22 n.40 (1979) (emphasizing need for "considerable" experience with a practice
before per se condemnation and remarking on the role of output reduction as the trigger for a
per se rule); National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692-93 (1978)
(per se rule applies only to agreements "whose nature and necessary effect are so plainly anticompetitive that no elaborate study of the industry is needed"); Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 50 n.16
(1977) (in establishing per se rules, "[t]he probability that anticompetitive consequences will result
from a practice and the severity of those consequences must be balanced against its procompetitive
consequences . . . [A] per se rule reflects the judgment that such cases are not sufficiently common
or important to justify the time and expense necessary to identify them.").
195. United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351, 1362-63 (5th Cir. 1980).
196. See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (legislative history of the Sherman
Act "suggest[s] that Congress designed [it] . . . as a 'consumer welfare prescription.' ") (quoting
R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADox 66 (1978)).
197. After Sylvania, exclusive territories are judged under the rule of reason. The Sylvania restraints were found lawful.
198. See Eastern Scientific Co. v. Wild Heerbrugg Instruments, Inc., 572 F.2d 883, 885-86
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 833 (1978) (holding that resale price-fixing is not unlawful, even
under Albrecht, when used as an ancillary device to implement territorial allocations).
199. Pitofsky, supra note 51, at 13.
200. Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
201. 433 U.S. at 50 n.16.
202. The framers of the U.S. Constitution recognized the importance of newspapers and made
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the courts in the past decade, the interests of judicial economy will be better
served by developing a sensible rule for their resolution.
The per se rule also has been defended on grounds that resale price ceilings
limit pricing and therefore prevent new competitors from entering a market.2 1"
This analysis focuses on a market in which the businesses conspire to keep
prices low enough to discourage potential entrants. However, the horizontal
conspiracy presents an antitrust problem independent of vertical price restrictions. This analysis also overlooks the economic reality that collusion is not
necessary because one firm could reduce its price to the entry-deterring level
and force others to follow suit.A'4 Others argue that the Albrecht rule helps

maintain the vitality of the per se rule against minimum price-fixing.""' Without
the rule against price ceilings, cartel-like activities would be more difficult to
prohibit. A limited exception for newspapers, however, would promote consumer
welfare without undercutting the rule against minimum price-fixing.
Some commentators have proposed a rule of per se legality.20" They argue
that if a manufacturer desires the most efficient distribution of its products, it
will not impose any restraint that will reduce the quantity demanded by consumers.2 1 7 This argument applies to all price restrictions, but is especially forceful
when applied to the newspaper industry because a newspaper's economic survival depends on distributing its papers to as many customers as possible.
However, a rule of reason approach would allow sufficient consideration of the
economic structure of the newspaper industry, while per se legality could place
undesirable power in the hands of monopoly newspapers.208 Resale price ceilings
should not be deemed per se legal because there may be situations where the
anticompetitive consequences imagined by Justice White in Albrecht,... are present
2
without the redeeming virtues outlined by Justice Harlan. 111

VII.

PLAYING THE TRUMP CARD IN OTHER BUSINESS CONTEXTS

The per se rule against resale price maintentance can be justified in a variety
of business situations that can be distinguished from the newspaper industry.
In competitive markets, vertical price restrictions present many dangers that
outweigh the interests of manufacturers who seek to control resale prices. 2" In
them the only constitutionally protected industry. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I. However, applying the
antitrust laws to newspapers does not violate the constitutional guarantee of a fee press. Associated
Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1945).
203. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 1, at 211-12.
204. Blair & Kaserman, supra note 2, at 465-66.
205. Harrison, supra note 2, at 946.
206. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 192.
207. Id. at 23.
208. An example would be exploiting the carriers by setting a price ceiling so low (i.e., so
close to the wholesale price) that they could not make a reasonable profit. Cf. L. SULLIVAN, supra
note 1, at 391.
209. AIbrecht, 390 U.S. at 152-54.
210. Id. at 156-58.
211. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 1, at 385-86; see also Jinkinson & Foster, Per Se Rules Against
Vertical Restraints: Down But Not Out, 58 WASH. U.L.Q. 795, 797 (1980) ("per se rules are critical
to both the preservation of the private antitrust lawsuit and the general economic welfare").
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many business situations, alternatives other than controlling resale prices are
available to manufacturers who want to ensure high sales volume, encourage
dealers to offer services beyond the sale of product, facilitate advertising, or
protect the manufacturer's good will and prestige.'"
Resale price maintenance generally destroys effective, pro-consumer, intrabrand competition.2 1 3 If retailers can set their own prices, market forces will
determine which type of distribution is most attractive to consumers and thus
maximizes sales. 21 4 Intrabrand price competition assures that prices"' will continue to be a reference point for consumers to use in making their decision on
the value offered them by competing businesses.
Even when competing brands of a product are on the market, resale price
competition may nevertheless be reduced significantly. "I This can occur when
the manufacturer cultivates a prestige image for its product.2 7 For example, a
whiskey manufacturer advertises that its product must be good because it costs
so much. This manufacturer is selling more than a tangible product; buyers
are also paying for a mystique. A manufacturer using this marketing strategy
may see resale price fixing as beneficial2 8 because price reductions by some
dealers could damage the whiskey's prestige by indicating that it is not worth
the usual price or is not purchased by fashionable consumers.2 19 However, the
whiskey manufacturer can achieve its goals by less restrictive means. " The
22
manufacturer's wholesale price usually serves as a minimum resale price. '
Some dealers may be able to shave the retail price, perhaps by selling the
prestige whiskey as a "loss leader" that will attract customers who then buy
other items,22 but this slight difference will not be enough to defeat the whiskey's prestige image.2 2 3 Resale price restrictions cannot be justified in this situation because the public interest in protecting marketing mystiques is
questionable2 4 and certainly does not outweigh the public benefits that result
22
from price competition among dealers. 5
Vertical price restrictions may help establish price-fixing conspiracies among

212. Lifland, Pitofsky & Popofsky, Advising Clients on Vertical Restraints, 51 ANTITRUST L.J. 50,
52-53 (1982); see also Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982) (supporting the
holding that the challenged restraint was per se illegal by suggesting an alternative and less restrictive
means of accomplishing the same ends).
213.
214.

L. SULLIVAN, supra note 1, at 379.
P. AREEDA, supra note 17, at 8-9.

215. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940). Accord, Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 23 (1979); National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978).
216. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 1, at 379; see also Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 51 n.18 (resale price
maintenance reduces competition between competing brands).
217. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 1, at 386.
218. R. POSNER, ANTTRusT CASES, ECONOMIC NOTES AND OrHER MATERIALS 234-37 (1981).
219. P. AREEDA, supra note 17, at 645.

220. Id.; L.

SULLIVAN,

P.

222.

Id. at 645-46.

223.

L.

224.
225.

P.
L.

AREEDA,

supra note 1, at 386.

supra note 17, at 645.

221.

SULLIVAN, supra note 1, at 386.
AREEDA, supra note 17, at 645.
SULLIVAN, supra note 1, at 379.
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dealers and manufacturers.2 2 6 If such restrictions are lawful when used for a
manufacturer's individual ends, many conspiracies to fix prices will go undetected because they will be easily camouflaged. Furthermore, resale price maintenance can stabilize price-fixing conspiracies.227 Each conspirator has an incentive
to cheat because a single retailer selling below the fixed cost has a competitive
advantage. Resale price maintenance makes cheating easier to detect and reinforces price-fixing conspiracies. 22 The Supreme Court has recognized the procompetitive benefits when participants in price-fixing arrangements undercut the
fixed price. The Court has also condemned mechanisms which help price-fixers
detect and shut off business practices that undercut the price fixed by the
conspirators. 2 9
Most of the goals which manufacturers seek to achieve through resale price
maintenance can be reached in other ways.2"' Through contracts, manufacturers
impose upon dealers objective standards relating to sales volume, service, advertising and promotion, goodwill and prestige by which dealers' performance
will be judged, and their contracts either renewed or terminated.25 Manufac2 12
turers can adopt a distribution program based on agency or consignment.
Manufacturers also can deal directly with the marketing concerns which are
often advanced as justifications for resale price maintenance. A manufacturer
can undertake service, promotion and advertising itself, or it can reimburse
2
retailers for their expenses in those activities. 31
The per se rule against resale price maintenance encourages the development
of innovative forms of retail competition.2 1 Catalog, outlet, and off-price stores
are recent examples of innovative retail enterprises. Many of these originate as
small businesses and would be barred from competition, unless given the chance
to demonstrate they can operate efficiently. Foreclosing these retailers from

226. See, e.g., R. BORK, supra note 7, at 292-95; L. SULLIVAN, supra note 1, at 383-84; Anderson,
The Antitrust Consequences of Manufacturer-Suggested Retail Prices: The Case for Presumptive Illegality, 54
WASH.

L. REV. 763, 785 (1979); Comanor, Vertical Territorial and Customer Restrictions: White Motor

and its Aftermath, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1426 (1968); Levmore, Rescuing Some Antitrust Law: An
Essay on Vertical Restrictions and Consumer Information, 67 IowA L. REV. 981, 986 (1982).

227. Pitofsky, supra note 51, at 15-16; Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis
of the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. REV.
282, 294 (1975).
228. P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 114, at 828d (one objection to resale price

maintenance is that oligopolistic manufacturers may use it to facilitate parallel pricing).
229. United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 43-48 (1960); FTC v. Beech-Nut
Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441, 456 (1922).
230.

See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 1, at 388, 389 (detailing the methods by which a manufacturer

could legally further such a relationship).
231. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 1, at 386.
232. See United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 488 (1926) (genuine contracts of
agency do not violate the antitrust laws). But see Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 24
(1964) ("To allow Union Oil to achieve price fixing ...through this 'consignment' device would
be to make legality for antitrust purposes turn on clever draftsmanship.").
233. Anderson, supra note 226, at 788; Gerhart, The "Competitive Advantages" Explanation for
Intrabrand Restraints, 1981 DUKE L.J. 417, 433; Levmore, supra note 226, at 983, 987.
234.

See, e.g., L. SULLIVAN, supra note 1, at 381.
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competing in price, using manufacturers' leading brands, effectively chokes off
their business opportunities.
The per se rule also protects consumers in several ways. For example,
although a neighborhood store charges a higher price for television sets, a
consumer may choose to shop there because of the convenience or the availability of service from a store near home. Another consumer may choose to
travel to a higher-volume, more efficient dealer who charges a lower price. In
this situation, the consumer's freedom of choice in the marketplace is protected
by the rule against resale price maintenance.2 3 The rule also protects consumers
by ensuring that retailers have the freedom to set prices in response to the
competitive demands of their individual markets. Resale prices set by a distant
manufacturer are inherently less responsive to the immediate demands of local
markets than prices determined by businesses whose existence and livelihood
depend upon price flexibility to meet those demands.211
Finally, there is a significant non-economic interest in facilitating dealer
independence.2 37 The Sherman Act is based on capitalistic (free-market) tenets
that unrestrained competition in the marketplace will produce the lowest prices,
2
the highest quality and the best use of this country's resources. 11
VIII.

A PROPOSAL

The ancillary restraints doctrine"" should be applied to bring newspaper
distribution cases under rule of reason scrutiny. The Supreme Court has already
applied the doctrine to bring several horizontal price-fixing arrangements under
the rule of reason. The Court has done this even though horizontal price-fixing
presents greater anticompetitive dangers than resale price ceilings. 2" The unique
economic structure of the newspaper industry minimizes, if not eliminates, the
potential harm of a resale price ceiling.2 4' A rule of reason approach would
allow the survival of hundreds of small, independent businesses while protecting
the consumer by limiting the monopoly pricing power of independent carriers.

235. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 226, at 788; Comanor, supra note 226, at 1430; Gerhart,
supra note 233, at 435.
236. See, e.g., L. SULLIVAN, supra note 1, at 377, 382, 387, 388 (1977); Anderson, supra note
226, at 788; seealso Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211, 213 (1951)
(vertical price-fixing agreements, whether they set minimum or maximum prices, "cripple the
freedom of traders and thereby restrain their ability to sell in accordance with their own judgment").
237. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 1, at 385-86.
238. Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958). In the words of Senator
Sherman, "[i]t is the right of every man to work, labor and produce in any lawful vocation and
to transport his production on equal terms and conditions and under like circumstances. This is
industrial liberty and lies at the foundation of the equality of all rights and privileges." 21 CONG.
REc. 2457 (1890).
239. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
240.

Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. at 348 n.18 (noting that horizontal

pricing agreements are generally regarded as more objectionable than vertical pricing restraints);
see also L. SULLIVAN, supra note 1, at 197-202.
241. See supra notes 30-50 and accompanying text.
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At the same time, this approach would limit the newspapers' ability to use
42
2
their own monopoly power.

The rule of reason is often considered objectionable because it opens the
courtroom doors to anything the parties wish to bring up. 24 Thus a rule of
reason trial involves inquiry into the market power of the defendant, the motives
44
and effects of the conduct, and the economics of the entire industry involved.
The social expense of such a trial, including court costs, attorney's fees, and
the expense of expert testimony by economists, has resulted in the per se exception to the rule of reason.2 45 Other proponents of the per se rule argue that
the rule of reason has little deterrent effect and often undermines antitrust
enforcement.2 4 6 However, these objections can be limited by using Justice Taft's
ancillary analysis as modified by recent Supreme Court decisions, which inquire
only into the facts unique to the business, the history of the restraint, and the
reasons why it was imposed.2 4 7 Under this formulation, the rule of reason can
be applied through a three-step analysis.
A.

Is the Restraint Ancillary to a Valid Purpose?

The first step in this framework is to determine whether the restraint's
purpose is to inhibit competition or whether it is ancillary to an arrangement
that benefits consumers. For example, a newspaper has a valid purpose in
establishing uniform home delivery subscription rates. Home delivery generally
makes up the largest percentage and most stable element of a daily newspaper's
readership.2 8 Any price increase may result in a loss of circulation and trigger
the downward spiral that can quickly destroy a newspaper.2 4' Newspapers will
be able to present sufficient evidence of benefits to their subscribers to survive
2 51
this step. '

B.

Is the Restraint Necessary to Accomplish That Purpose?

The second step in the analysis is to determine the function of the restraint.
242. See supra note 208.
243. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). The Court described
rule of reason analysis as:

IT]he court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature
of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil
believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought

to be achieved, are all relevant facts.
Id.
244. Id.
245.
246.

Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 36.
Pitofsky, supra note 51, at 2, 13, 33 (rule of reason treatment is "largely an effort to

measure the immeasurable").
247. See, e.g., National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691-95
(1978).
248. NEWSPAPERS AND ANTITRUST, supra note 6, at 89.
249. See id. at 3.
250.

See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
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The newspaper defendant will demonstrate that a price ceiling is a necessary
condition in granting an exclusive territory to a carrier. The lack of competition
among carriers, which is inherent in exclusive territories, insulates carriers from
price competition.2 "' Exclusive routes are economically necessary because newspaper delivery routes are most efficient when one person delivers the newspapers
to all subscribers within a specific territory. As a result, newspaper routes are
25 2
natural monopolies.
C.

Is the Restraint No More Than Necessary?

The third step in the analysis is to determine whether there is a less restrictive alternative. The newspaper can demonstrate that its only viable alternative- to a resale price ceiling is vertical integration and complete ownership
of distribution, a far more restrictive alternative. 2 1' Newspapers have tried to
find alternatives to vertical integration, but none have proved both economically
and legally sound. Other methods of controlling monopolistic practices of distributors, workable in other industries, are not viable in the newspaper industry
because of its unique economic structure. The following is a list of these methods.
(1) One possibility is placing more than one newspaper carrier in the
same distribution area. This possibility would technically increase competition, but it also would produce higher costs and higher prices than4
price.21
permitting a monopolist carrier to charge his profit-maximizing
255
This practice is non-existent in the newspaper industry.
(2) A second possibility is exercising control over its carriers by offering
contestable delivery routes. 25 6 Prospective carriers would bid for routes,
and the publisher would award each route to the bidder who promises
to deliver the paper at the lowest price. By reopening the routes for
competitive bidding each time a contract expires, the newpaper could
ensure that its papers were delivered at a competitive price, even though
the carrier was a monopolist for the duration of his contract. However,
this entry bidding, in which one term of the contract is the delivery
price of the newspaper, has been held to be illegal resale price main251. See supra note 51.
252. A price ceiling raises no question of fairness to the carriers, who routinely are told of
the newspaper's suggested maximum price when they begin delivering newspapers. Therefore, they
could not legitimately claim to have made an investment based upon the belief that they would
be free to charge whatever price they chose. Blair & Kaserman, supra note 2, at 476.
253. See Albrecht, 390 U.S. 145, and cases cited supra note 12.
254. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
255. Interview with Philip K. Hanna, vice president of The New York Times Regional Newspaper Group, in Holmes Beach, Fla., May 15, 1986 [hereinafter cited as Hanna Interview].
256. Hovenkamp, supra note 10, at 461-62. Under the theory of contestable markets, an unregulated natural monopoly can be made to behave as competitively as a market with dozens of
incumbents, if entry costs into the market are low and exit costs are nonexistent or very low.
Baumol, Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of Indaustry Structure, 72 AM. EcON. REv. 1
(1982). In general, the lower the start-up costs and the exit price, the more a contestable natural
monopoly will approximate competitive behavior. Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities?, 11 J. L. & EcON.
55, 56-61 (1968).
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tenance under Albrecht. Most courts have interpreted Albrecht to mean
that a newspaper cannot control, by bidding or otherwise, the maximum
price that an independent carrier charges its customers.2 7 The contestable
route concept would also prove unwieldy and unworkable because a turnof one hundred percent or more a year is
over rate among carriers
258
considered routine.

(3) Another possibility would be terminating those carriers who charge
above the suggested retail price. This possibility may violate section 1
such
of the Sherman Act when used
25 9 as a signal to other dealers that
conduct will not be tolerated.
(4) A final alternative might be one used by the Washington Post in its
attempt to fight a carrier's price increase by raising the price it charged
the carrier by the same amount.2 "1 The district court held the retaliatory
action to be an illegal restraint of trade. 21 However, a similar pricing
system used by The New York Post was approved by a federal district
court because it was applied to all carriers.2 62 The distributors were required to pay the newspaper sixty percent of the proceeds obtained by
charging more than the newspaper's suggested retail price.2 63 Although
this may appear to be a viable, less restrictive alternative, it presents
several problems. First, it does not achieve the economic and administrative efficiencies of a uniform price charged to all subscribers.2 4 Second, it makes the newspaper appear to encourage higher prices, which
may prompt greater numbers of carriers to raise prices. 265 Finally, it
might further confuse the courts by defusing the newspaper industry's
strongest argument in favor of price ceilings, that is,2 6 its need to keep
prices low to attract as many subscribers as possible. "
As a practical matter, a newspaper might protect itself from antitrust suits
by keeping its carrier routes small enough to ensure that no individual carrier
has a large enough monetary stake to pursue an action against the newspaper.2 1
However, it would be difficult to limit the number of subscribers solicited by
an ambitious carrier because the newspaper could be charged with coercive
257. See, e.g., Auburn News Co. v. Providence Journal Co., 659 F.2d 273 (1st Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 921 (1982).
258. Hanna Interview, supra note 255. "Good" routes - those with stable subscriber lists
and easy delivery - are, of course, more stable than routes where new customers must constantly
be solicited and collections or deliveries are difficult. Id.
.259. Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., 548 F.2d 795, 804-05 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433
U.S. 910 (1977). However, terminating all the independent dealers merely for the purpose of implementing a new distribution system will not support a price-fixing allegation. Id. at 805; see also
Lamarca v. Miami Herald Co., 395 F. Supp. 324, 327 (S.D. Fla.), aff'd mer., 524 F.2d 1230 (5th

Cir. 1975).
260. Newberry, 438 F. Supp. 470. Se supra notes 111-25 and accompanying text.
261. Newberry, 438 F. Supp. at 480-82.
262. Martindell v. News Group Publications, Inc., 580 F. Supp. 330 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). The
Court distinguished Newberry on grounds that The Washington Post had made an example of
Newberry rather than applying a pricing schedule equally to all distributors. Id. at 333.
263. Id. at 331.

264. See supra note 166.
265. Hanna Interview, supra note 255.
266.

See supra note 30-33 and accompanying text.

267. Hanna Interview, supra note 255.
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action or it could lose the carrier. Limiting the potential profits from a route
also limits the number and type of people who would be interested in the job.
The routes would also have to be very small, because in private actions filed
under the Sherman Act, damages are trebled.2 1 9 A newspaper's only protection
against price increases, thus, are management techniques that encourage carrier
cooperation 2 'J and the carriers' ignorance of their own power to raise prices.
IX.

CONCLUSION

Prevailing antitrust law has the perverse effect of diminishing consumer
welfare rather than promoting it when applied to the newspaper publishing
industry. Preserving the carrier's independence permits him to raise prices with
impunity. On the other hand, permitting a newspaper to set maximum prices
provides the same check on pricing excesses that a competitive market structure
normally provides. Therefore, the application of per se rules to newspaper price
ceilings is inappropriate and inefficient. The per se rule forces newspapers into
the more restrictive alternative of vertical integration into distribution. Using
the ancillary restraints doctrine to apply the rule of reason to newspaper distribution cases would not be a dramatic shift in the law of resale price maintenance. The original rule of reason and the decision in Dr. Miles were based
upon it. The resale pricing cases that followed Dr. Miles might have been decided
the same way with the ancillary approach. It also coincides with the Supreme
Court's most recent antitrust decisions. The ancillary restraints doctrine and
the rule of reason provide the most principled method of solving the legal
conundrum that confronts the newspaper industry today. This solution benefits
both newspapers and consumers, whose interests in low prices coincide. It also
benefits the independent businessmen who deliver the newspapers because unless
newspapers can legally prevent price increases by carriers, more and newspapers
will switch to self-delivery and eliminate hundreds of independent businesses.
JACQUELINE DOWD

268. 15 U.S.C.A. S 15 (Supp. 1986).
269. Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., 548 F.2d 795, 806 n.13 (9th Cir. 1976) (newspaper's efforts to convince the carriers that "increased circulation is good for everybody"), cert. denied, 433

U.S. 910 (1977).
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